After weeks of media speculation on the prospective “Common Candidate”, to every one’s relief, confirmed news about General Sarath Fonseka’s decision to retire from military service with effect from 01st December, 2009, came on 12th Thursday afternoon. It would in reality mean his retirement from the extended service in the army. Yet it is also taken as his retirement from his new post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), as well.
Those who respected him as a “Sinhala hero” for defeating the LTTE and Prabhakaran, probably sighed in relief, that his retirement, was accepted by the President without any fuss and hesitation. For those who want him as the next President and to contest as the “common candidate” but feared he would be holed in by the President in denying his release from service, were also relieved, when it was clear the President would not stoop that low.
Then came the letter itself by Friday afternoon, accompanied by an annexure “A”. The letter was titled “Request to retire from the regular service from the army”. The 16 point annexure “A” was titled, “Factors affecting my retirement from the Regular force of the army”.
In normal circumstances, any retirement is based on reaching the maximum age approved for service and in special cases come the issue of health. Both those reasons don’t necessitate a special annexure to the letter requesting retirement, titled “Factors affecting my retirement from ……..”. Therefore, General Fonseka’s letter of retirement along with this “annexure A” is special and certainly deserves public scrutiny.
The most glaring info any one could have from even the first brief glance of General Fonseka’s letter, is that his only reason for this hasty retirement is a “very personal power feud” between the two most powerful “Rajapaksa brothers” and him. It had evolved, according to the letter, immediately after the war was declared over.
Listed as number “4” in his letter, he says, “Considering the facts mentioned in the Annex and more, which I am privy to withhold, I am compelled to believe that Your Excellency and the Government has lost your trust and faith bestowed upon me for reasons best known to Your Excellency.” Thus we are told, the Annexure “A” by itself does not reveal all things that had gone into his decision. Thereafter he says, “Hence as the senior most serving military officer in the Country with 40 years of service, such a situation does not warrant a continuation of my duties any longer,….” Therefore his request, to be permitted to terminate his services and retire from 1st December 2009.
While there are other reasons the General is “privy to withhold” (from the public ?) the most important reasons to assume, President Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya R had in fact been certain, they don’t need the General any more after the war, are included in his annexure “A”, quite in detail.
Numbered as ‘6’ in the annexure, he says [quote] Your Excellency, you too made a statement at the very first security council soon after the 18 May, 2009 when the battle was declared over, that “no further recruitment was necessary” and “a strong public opinion is in the making, stating that the country is in possession of a too powerful army…..” [unquote]
The General says, or rather subtly accuses the President, for making the same statement, even after the General handed over the command of the army. Explaining this statement by the President at the Security Council, the General assumes, [quote] I personally felt that Your Excellency has commenced mistrusting your own loyal Army which attained the unimaginable victory just a week ago [unquote]
The General goes on to say that the Defence Secretary “was bold enough” to state in a service commanders’ meeting that it would be dangerous if, “operational control of all three services is granted to the CDS” (No. 5 in annexure) after General Fonseka was appointed to the post of CDS.
What does all these statements adduced to the two most politically powerful Rajapaksas in this country, mean between lines, if not directly ? The war had allowed the growth of a powerful large army, and as General Fonseka claims, it was with his (General Fonseka’s) “vision, command and leadership that this yeomen task was achieved.” Thus, the “loyalty of the Sri Lanka Army towards me (the General) as its past Commander who led the Army to the historic victory.” (No. 8 in the annexure) left no command access even to the vociferous Secretary Defence.
On the flip side of this understatement(s) by the General and not touched upon by him, is the fact that all during the war period, which he says stretched to 03 years and 07 months, he was also allowed to project himself as a political leader of the war. Or, he was powerful enough to play a political role, that the Head of State and the Defence Secretary could not stop him from, while the war was being waged.
His political statements to the media, both locally and internationally, were never contradicted by the political leaders of this regime. The political role General Fonseka played during that heady period, narrowed the gap between the Executive power which is a civil power and the defence establishment. Most political decisions interpreted in terms of “security” that effected civil life drastically, was certainly influenced by the defence establishment and General Fonseka was there as its head. He cannot therefore claim he has an unstained, clean pair of hands.
The unwritten statement(s) in this ‘two part’ retirement request is that the General who was himself a political (Sinhala) ideologist too, did want to continue in command at the head of this powerful army which he was also instrumental in instilling with a Sinhala Buddhist ideology by all his public statements. He wanted continued command with increased numbers too.
That is why General Fonseka was disturbed when President Rajapaksa decided, that “no further recruitment was necessary” after the war was victoriously concluded. That is also why General Fonseka says, he “was mislead on the authority vested with the CDS.”
He wanted “more command responsibilities and authority than earlier” and he thought he was going to have such powers as the CDS. So he laments, he was mislead and complaints, with his appointment as CDS, he was served with “a letter by the Strategic Affairs Adviser to the Secretary Defence indicated that my appointment was purely to coordinate the services and not that of overall command.” (No. 4 in annexure)
What more. He notes quite frankly, “Such actions clearly defines Your Excellency’s and the government’s unwillingness to grant me with command responsibilities…” The rest of the annexure is used in providing reasons to the claim(s) the General makes about the decline of professionalism in the army, after he was moved out of command responsibility.
Such a mindset with a will to further increase numbers in thousands, as we have heard, perhaps made the Rajapaksa regime paranoid about their own status in power. An insecurity the Head of State would have felt and perhaps the reason to hastily move the General out into a senior position, with a ceremonial flavour than with command responsibility.
Whether moving General SF out of overall command so fast is right or wrong, the fact remains, he was passionate about being in overall Command of the army for a longer period than he was allowed. Thus the issue now is whether the UNF and its allies are willing to hand over the all powerful Executive Presidency that could even move out a battle hardened, 40 year serviceman, to such a power loving, power needy General.
This UNF and its allies are gelled together on the singularly hyped slogan of abolishing the powerful presidency. This presidency had been promised to be done away with, during all elections since 1994 August. Promised by civilians who aspired to the presidency, who thereafter forgot they had promised so. Promised by political leaders who had a social binding to the people, more direct than any other, who had only been trained and disciplined to wield regimented power.
Thus all the pious talk that would hereafter ensue by one who has quite a heavy load of dirty and smelly baggage, will be within the regimented discipline of wielding absolute power.
Everything else that has suddenly popped up including that of the “plight of the IDPs” as a “point of great concern” and the sentence included in the annexure that they should be allowed to stay with their friends and relatives till de-mining is complete, though high sounding, would be within his very consistent Sinhala-Buddhist ideology of believing that Sri Lanka belongs to the 75% Sinhalese and that minorities “can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things”. (Canadian National Post – 23 September 2008). What is undue for these Tamil IDPs of course, would thus be decided by this Sinhala regimented mindset.
Therefore this country can never ever have any guarantee of a return to better democratic and inclusive, civilian life from one who tenders his resignation solely because the power he wanted was not afforded to him. From one who had never been experiencing democratic traditions in decision making and implementing and lived a ‘Musharaffian’ life.
Where this country would thus be led by the Opposition UNF and its allies, will therefore be far chilling and dangerous than by any corrupt, politically insincere, nepotistic Sinhala Don Quixote.