One of the more refined gratifications in my life is the friendship of a few renowned intellectuals like Richard Falk, Emeritus Professor of International Law and Policy at Princeton, and the occasional receipt from him of work in progress. The other day’s email contained three scintillating draft essays, two of which I have finished reading and one that I have commented on.  This time however, what is a guaranteed treat also gave me cause for sorrow. A closely and creatively argued piece on Threat Diplomacy contained an important segment on the World Court’s judgment on nuclear weapons and war, and made several references to Justice Weeramantry’s dissenting judgment.  I had known from conversations that Richard Falk had known and liked CG Weeramantry from encounters when they were much younger, but I felt a twinge of sadness that so fine a mind as to be acknowledged by so renowned an intellectual (almost a sage) as Prof Falk, has not, as far as I know, been consulted by the Sri Lankan leadership at a time that the Sri Lankan state is and has been facing complex challenges of international law. This is so despite several recommendations by me to that effect to the highest authorities, and prompt assent which was never followed up or implemented.

A prophet is without honour only in his own land, says the Bible, and this is true of Judge Weeramantry, whose stances, when taken together, constitute a principled and distinctly ethical ontology: anti-terrorist (Lockerbie), anti-nuclear war (dissenting judgment of ’96), pro-sovereignty and international law (critiques of NATO Kosovo bombing, Iraq War), pro-human rights (definitive three volume work) and inter-ethnic, multi-religious peace-building (UNESCO prize, Weeramantry foundation).  We have therefore, the best stance for Sri Lankan ‘being in the world’, what I choose to call (given their close friendship and intellectual congruency) the Kadirgamar-Weeramantry outlook, approach or model. We also have at least two paradigmatic choices for Sri Lankan engagement with the world order: Weeramantry or Weerawansa?

What pains me most is not that the Sri Lankan state has not availed itself of the counsel of Judge Weeramantry, but that it has gone in precisely the opposite direction of the counsel he has publicly given. It has ignored and contradicted the wisdom of this sagacious man on matter of the greatest national importance for this and future generations of Sri Lankans. In the post-war year, Sri Lanka has proceeded far more in consonance with the narrow views of raucous lawyer-ideologues than with the counsel of that greatest of Sri Lankan jurists.

Shortly after the victory over the Tigers last year, Judge Weeramantry wrote a two part essay which I read in the Daily Mirror.  He advised us that we were at a crucial turning point, and brought to our attention the lessons of history as represented by two contradictory models of post war policy architecture, which brought two enormously varying sets of consequences. The first was in the aftermath of World War I, when a punitive ‘victors peace’, the Treaty of Versailles, was designed and imposed on defeated Germany. The result ten years later was the emergence of fascism, in fifteen its triumph and in twenty a terrible new war. The second model was the post World War II peace. Though the destruction of Germany and Japan were the most awful (and in the latter case, unprecedented in human history), these two states became peaceful and firm partners of the Western alliance thanks to a generous and far sighted policy, based on the recognition of the mistakes committed after the First World War. The Marshall Plan and the creation of a free, prosperous liberal society with political freedom permanently pacified these countries and turned their citizens into firm partners of the West. This was the cement of the security alliances, pacts and network of bases that locked these areas firmly into the Western strategic architecture.

Judge Weeramantry warned us explicitly against the Versailles spirit and a ‘victor’s peace’, and urged us to adopt the post WWII model of sensitivity, liberalism, generosity, political freedom and alliance building. But have we done so? Are we doing so? Or are we heading in exactly the opposite direction?

In a critical review of my first book, Prof AJ Wilson, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of New Brunswick and son-in law of SJV Chelvanayagam, kindly ventured the opinion that “Dayan… is perhaps the last liberal thinker among the Sinhalese” (Sunday Island, March 23, 1997, p14, 16). If I am a ‘liberal thinker’ then I am a liberal Realist who supports the establishment of a sufficient and permanent Sri Lankan military presence on state land in the North and East. However, I am also wary of the establishment of permanent housing for military families and the acquisition of privately owned land for that purpose.

The reason for my support and opposition is security of the state and society. Sri Lanka is one country and the state has every right to establish armed encampments and deploy its armed forces wherever it sees fit. I have no problem with the exercise of that right. Yet, just as every other right it must be exercised prudently, because the unity of Sri Lanka as a single country is not the only aspect of Sri Lanka’s reality that must be taken into account. Ours is also a multiethnic country with a historically evolved and stable ethno-demography. The Tamils consider the Northern Province as their ancestral lands, the land of their grandfathers and great grandfathers.  I have met seventh generation Malaysian Tamils who are emotionally attached to Kokuvil as their native place, where their roots run back to.

The establishment of a strong military presence is necessary because the state and the citizenry can no longer be suckered. The Sri Lankan state must internalise the military lessons of all the wars it has had to fight in the North East and deploy troops in a manner that the area is strategically as impregnable as is possible to render it. The Sri Lankan military deployments in the North and East must never be vulnerable again, militarily or logistically. They must be capable of safeguarding our outer borders as well as preventing/pre-empting terrorism and low intensity insurgency.

The Sri Lankan military configuration in the North and East must be capable of deterring or fighting and winning future wars. But it must not be the cause or catalyst for future conflict.  That would be self-defeating because it would not enhance national security; it would undermine it.

Had Sri Lanka either been bereft of an internal ethno-national question (the Tamil question)  or had the Sri Lankan military been multiethnic in composition,  the acquisition of private land for high security zones and permanent housing for military families would not have been so serious a problem.  We are dealing with the reality of a mono-ethnic, monolingual, mono-religious military establishing permanent housing for their families in a differently mono-ethnic area with a high degree of sub-nationalist consciousness.

There would be those who argue that a mono-ethnic army was able, against all expectation, to win a war against terrorism and separatism on the home turf of the insurgents. This is not strictly true. The achievement of the Sri Lankan armed forces was both greater than that and different from it.  The Sri Lankan army defeated a rival secessionist army, a powerful militia, not a guerrilla insurgency or terrorist network. The Tigers had long outgrown those stages and hypertrophied to the socio-politically unsustainable level of a parallel armed force, fighting a quasi-conventional war.

Today, the state must deploy the armed forces in the North and East in a manner that deters and prevents future conflict and rather than sows the seeds for it, either in the forms of terrorism, guerrilla cells or unarmed civic resistance. The establishment of permanent military bases strictly within state (‘Crown’) land is doubtless imperative to guarantee the first objective, but the acquisition of private land and the settlement of military families could trigger the latter. The permanent settlement of military families means places of religious worship, schools, shops, cinemas, services, etc, and the first sign of protest would also mean widening the zone, narrowing access to the civilians of the area, perhaps new access roads and the proliferation of checkpoints. This may seem an excellent method of population mixing, but that works as a method o conflict transformation only if population movement is as a result of natural economic factors, not unilateral state policy.  The Tamils in Wellawatte were not brought there as part of state policy.

These ideas for the North and East are not new—and nor is the critique. A read through the Lanka Guardian and The Island’s ‘Kautilya’ column of the 1980s would show the repeated warnings by Mervyn de Silva, who was, among other things, widely acknowledged as the country’s leading expert on Israel/Palestine and the Middle East, about the ideas of a wing of the JR Jayewardene government of the time. These ideas, identified with then Minister of National Security but also shared by the President’s son and security advisor Ravi Jayewardene, located in and derived from an irrelevant external matrix, were dangerously inapplicable to Sri Lanka, would worsen the ethnic problem and generate a backlash from the regional power, warned my father. ‘In an age of identity, ethnicity walks on water’ he said, pointing to inflamed sentiment in proximate Tamil Nadu and the increasingly influential Diaspora, of which the Sinhalese had no equivalent or counterweight to.  As it turned out, it was not the Tamil Tiger insurgency which put a halt to Minister Athulathmudali’s and Ravi Jayewardene’s importation of ‘the West Bank model’ as the Lanka Guardian called it, but precisely the ‘geo-political realities’ – the absence or furling of a superpower umbrella in the event of an abrupt assertion by the regional power — that Mervyn de Silva had tried to drum home into the ruling elite, to no avail, until the external ‘seismic shock’ of mid-1987.

Realism tells us that the North and East have to be secure over the long term. It tells us that the Sri Lankan security forces will remain overwhelmingly mono-ethnic at least in the short term. Realism, which is drawn in large part from world history, further tells us that in such a situation, a policy of permanent encampments and fortifications must be accompanied by alliances with the local elites and a degree of local autonomy. That autonomy must not be so large as to be dysfunctional to security and strategy but must be sufficiently broad to pre-empt local disaffection.  This has been the policy of successful empires from Rome to Britain.

Having an intermediate structure elected by the local populace and positioned between itself and the local populace, provides the Sri Lankan security forces with a social shock absorber and vital adjunct in preventive counter-insurgency. Sadly, it would seem as though Sri Lankan policy projections do not involve this latter aspect of sufficient local autonomy, and that the security aspect is designed to overlook, override, bypass or undermine that local autonomy should it be implemented under external pressure or internal political compulsion. The great Asian strategic thinker-practitioner Mao Ze Dong advocated a policy of ‘walking on two legs’. We seem intent on marching forward on one. The increased alienation of the Tamil people of the North and a widening gulf between the collective psyches of our main communities cannot be a pathway to stable security and permanent peace. The so-called demographic solution is no solution, as has been proved even in its conceptual birthplace — and notwithstanding a superpower blank cheque that Sri Lanka will never have.

While ‘facts are being created on the ground’, if the elected representatives of the Tamil people remain divided, with some dreaming of self-determination and others of federalism, and still others refuse to talk to their erstwhile comrades who are in government, instead of collectively pressing for the reasonable demand of the ‘turnkey’ re-activation of the existing Constitutional provisions as reiterated in bilateral statements and international undertakings, then these Tamil representatives will have only themselves to blame for the continuing and perhaps irreversible Tamil tragedy.

As if the inter-ethnic gap was not bad enough, the dominant ideology seems intent on setting the stage for generations of inter-religious hostility as well. Spokespersons for the Catholic Church well known for their moderation such as Fr Benedict Joseph and Fr Cyril Gamini have raised their voices in protest against the religious prejudices and overt mono-religiosity of the new History text books currently in use in Sri Lankan schools. What I find particularly disconcerting is that there was an earlier series of History text books in the pipe-line prepared and/or approved by some of Sri Lanka’s highest qualified historians and archaeologists such as Profs Sudharshan Seneviratne and Nira Wickramasinghe. Those rational well founded and enlightened texts were scrapped at the insistence of the rabble-rousing dominant ideologues and replaced with those that the spokespersons of the Catholic Church are now protesting against.

Sri Lanka is today at a crossroads. One road leads to reconciliation and a fresh start which enables us to integrate with Asia’s march to modernity. The other leads to a new and prolonged cycle of conflict.  The right kind of security policy for the North and East, a policy which derives from the best practises globally, a policy which is scientific and professional rather than driven by wrong interpretations of history and ethno-religious motivations, will enhance and ensure security. The wrong kind of security policy for the post-war North and East in which Sri Lankan armed forces cantonments become interlinked oases embedded in a hostile local population, may turn the entire area into a high insecurity zone.

###

Justice C.G. Weeramantry was bestowed Sri Lankabhimanya, the highest National Honour of Sri Lanka in 2007. Justice Weeramantry also won the UNESCO Peace Education Prize in 2006 and the Right Livelihood Award in 2007, considered alternative Nobel Prize.

In this interview conducted several months ago, Justice Weeramantry talks about the importance of peace education in post-war Sri Lanka as a pillar of reconciliation. He also looks back at his career in law and experience as a Judge of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) from 1991 to 2000.

• Interview with Justice C.G. Weeramantry
• Defense and Devolution
• Rebuilding the East and Other Stories . . .
• Daily Security Report from UN – The plight of the North & East
• India, Sri Lanka and the Minority Question

We find the word condolences stunning in its insufficiency for past and future.

We evacuated our homes in the light; we vanished from our homes in the dark; we walked away from our families, toward the weapons, and wished that we could turn around. Our bodies entered the earth in places we cannot now identify, and so we are everywhere, blown to dust. By both dying in and surviving this place, we will live here long after your condolences become a ghost in your throat.

We joined others’ battles, willingly and unwillingly; we walked forward on paths not our own when the paths we would have chosen were closed to us. We were incidental; we were vital; we were enemies; we were friends; we were disputed; we were uncounted. In a small country, we felt far away from you. In a small world, we felt far away from you. We were your people and not your people.

We could not wait for you to remember us.

We perished and survived and were less and also more for it. Some of us had little money and little food; we had children. We lost our children willingly and unwillingly. They were torn from our hands; we fought to keep them with us; we pushed them away from us to save them; we held them close in the hope that we might take their bullets and thereby die before them.

Some of us did, but some of us lived, and so the memory of this will outlast even the children we fought to save.

In the rush to escape this bloodletting, which has been its own kind of war, our ears fell to the ground, and so we cannot now hear your condolences. To survive, we had to shut our eyes, with which we would have seen what was in yours. We closed our mouths against hunger and anger; we knew and did not know our families, friends, fellows, and leaders, who hunted us, ran with us, and died with us.

We faced ourselves from all sides. Some of us lived. We are still here. We regret to inform you that your condolences cannot be accepted at this time.

• Two testimonies from families released from Menik Camp
• July: Life after 25 years
• We are nobody’s children…
• What must it be like to live behind these Kovil gates?
• “We are not willing to go back to our village, till a permanent solution for the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka”

Many Federal Party supporters faulted the candidates for avoiding public visibility. They asked: how can we vote for those who are reluctant to publicly or privately ask for our votes? But in the end they did vote for the Federal Party candidates, as did many who had never been Federal Party supporters. The faults they found in the Federal Party were nothing in comparison to those they found in the violent armed groups.

Of those armed groups, the LTTE ceased to exist in May 2009, but some of the other groups remain active in public life. They fared poorly in the recent local government elections in the North and proved to be ineffective in the Presidential Elections in January 2010. They are in the field for the Parliamentary Elections due in a few days. Whatever faults the voters may find in the non-gun carrying political parties, our priority is surely to eradicate the gun culture.

I have no doubt that the voters of the North and East will rise to the occasion as they have done more than once in the past and help to ensure that this time the violent gun carrying groups disappear from the political scene.

• Elections in the East
• The Tamil Population and the Politics of Boycotts and Non Participation
• The loud and clear message from the voter turnout and the voters in the North and East
• Exploring the Myth that the Tamil vote will be the decider at the Presidential Elections
• Provincial Council Elections 2008/2009: Nominations for and representation of women

Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai in Saainthamaruthu

Today is the 5^th anniversary of a tsunami that devastated our country.Five years on, but how many of us still care for the people who suffered?

The tsunami hit the Indian Ocean, killing nearly hundreds of thousands in eleven countries and inundating coastal communities with waves unto one hundred feet. According to experts, it was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and India were the hardest hit.

About thirty thousand people were killed in tsunami, millions injured and many more left homeless in Sri Lanka. The tidal waves hit North, East and South coastal areas.

All rushed to the spots to help the victims on December 26^th 2004. People canceled their holidays, and work and took part in the process of recovering dead bodies and clearing debris. I covered the tsunami stories continuously for many months. I have traveled to North, East and South of Sri Lanka to cover untold stories. I kept traveling to the same areas after many years. My memories stand still like statues in my mind. I keep meeting the same people in these areas, where they are still struggling to survive. Most of the survivors are hesitant to recall the memories saying “it brings sadness and they want to pray for their loved ones who were killed to rest in peace”. The memories are sad and unforgettable!

There are 55 families – 205 persons (males-60 persons, females-80 persons, and children-65 persons) still live in tin sheds in Sainthamaruthu (in the Eastern Province), living behind the Jummah Mosque. Their living space is squeezed into few meters. There are only two toilets which are currently functioning, there in only one bathroom for males and females. And only three drinking water taps are in the compound. The place gets flooded immediately when it rains. It is very hot inside during the Sunny days. Snakes are their frequent visitors in the night. Flu and Chicken Pox have been infected by many in the past.

The living space looks congested with few furniture, kitchen utensils and clothes and few of them have pets such as cats and chicken. The residents here are frustrated to continue live under these circumstances. Their houses were under 65 meter buffer zone in Saainthamaruthu. They feel that “they are nobody’s people”. Most them here in Saainthamaruthu think they are not lucky, and curse their fate for being unfortunate. “Will we be getting permanent houses next year?” many ask often, but the question remains unanswered.

• Sri Lanka on tsunami alert after Indonesia quake (Updated)
• Daily Security Report from UN – The plight of the North & East
• A Wave of Relief
• Better Governance: The Biggest Lesson of 2004 Tsunami
• Baby 81: 6 years after the tsunami

My reflection will be in the context of the present situation. How are these two entities – the Public servant and the Politician relating to each other in today’s world.  Not what the relationship was in a golden past or in a unlikely imagined future. And since my own view is that the relationship today is inherently unsatisfactory, how it could be improved or reformed to benefit the ultimate stakeholder, the public, which is the real object of the executive exercise.

Also my comments will be on what can be done immediately within the political, social and economic framework of what we have. Otherwise we may be talking about an ideal future which is only a dream and frankly not an useful exercise. Is there a magic button you could press to start the process of improvement.

Let us examine the heart of the relationship today between the politician and the public servant. It is that of a greatly empowered Executive on the one hand and a generally non-productive, disempowered public service on the other.

To be fair, in any objective assessment of the empowered executive, and the prime example of this is the Sri Lankan Executive Presidency (as has been said the most powerful political office holder in the world) there have been some successes – for example; the free market reforms in 1978 and the ending of Conflict, more recently. But it also has to be said that these were at great cost. Market reform increased the gap between the rich and the poor; the end of the War in addition to the loss and injury to many thousands, destroyed assets and has opened us to international condemnation on the means adopted.)

The relationship – between Politician and Public servant – at all levels of the administration – displays the in essence the following  features.

1. A powerful dominant politician, not only at the apex of the polity but  – at every level – Minister, MP, Provincial councillor or Pradeshiya sabhikaya. All these office holders acquire and are clothed with the authority of the Executive President, perhaps not by law but in their own perception and that of the people they apparently serve.
2. AND, concurrently a disempowered, servile, public servant, again at all levels.  To put it crudely rather like a wife in a dominant family relationship. Be available  – on call – for cooking or sex or looking after the children – and above all, keep your mouth shut.
3. This relationship could be harmonious; perhaps very much so ;  but in fact it could also be rather dull and unproductive for a public servant who is professionally trained and wants to do a job of work. He has got in to a service by merit and would like to prove it. But he is constantly being told how to do his job. He is as they say in the jargon ‘micro managed’. He is rarely asked for advice or consulted.
4. The subject for our discussion seems to suggest that there should be’ No conflict’  between the two parties. My submission is that is a ‘non Question’.  The system simply leaves no space for conflict. If you make trouble you could be thrown into the pool or jail; and if the conflict poses any real danger to the power of the politician it could be always solved through a little bit of roughing up or even some well-known cases where a recalcitrant media has been involved, even with elimination.

In short, it is my submission that the question posed by the thought provoking subject put to us, is really irrelevant to the real world of today.

What then can the sane people here – and I count Hon Minister Sarath Amunugama among that lot,  hope to do. That is again in the present situation,  without basically changing the given architecture and instruments of governance we have now.  The remedy clearly, has to be structural; nothing superficial and piecemeal will be sufficient.

I submit we have the ability and the means to do it. What is needed is the political will.

What is the way forward?

1. Implement the depoliticization instruments presently available. i.e appoint without further delay the Constitutional Council (It is already part of  the Constitution. (isn’t it a violation of the Constitution not to do so and are not all office-holders who presently hold such offices, such as commissioners and so on,  doing so in defiance, at least morally of the Constitution ?)
2. I think its non – implementation  has  diminished the value of the Constitution. In my view it is the root cause of the breakdown of discipline and overall law and order. The predominant problems of the public service, the judiciary and the  electoral system arise from this. Why should anyone care for, or follow the Constitution and any of its provisions any more.
3. So let the Constitutional Council, when the magic button is pressed, begin to  advise the President about whom to appoint to the key posts – PSC, JSC, Elections Commissioner, Chief Justice, IGP, AG etc – (after all, they (the constitutional Council) can’t all be so stupid as to suggest the appointment of knaves and imbeciles. And the process is open and provides space for negotiation. So what’s the problem?)
4. How will the magic button work?.  In several simple ways.  For the public service, the protection from political harassment that  a non – politically appointed PSC will provide will directly empower the public service. They will know that there is someone else other than the government Minister, MP, etc, etc, to whom they can appeal against an improper order.
5. Secretaries to Ministries and Heads of Departments of Government will continue to be appointed by and accountable to the Executive namely the  President and the Cabinet.. These will remain political appointments. Whether their relationship with the politician will be  harmonious or conflictual or something in between  – the nagging wife syndrome in our metaphor – will depend on the relative strength of personality and  negotiating skills of the individual concerned.
6. In the final analysis however these public servants ie Secretaries and Heads of Departments,  would have recourse to fundamental rights action. A non – political, proactive judiciary may be the best safeguard for these categories of officials who do not have the protection of the empowered PSC , against any glaring act of executive injustice.
7. There has been some talk of Codes of Conduct for public servants and politicians. I am afraid I don’t believe in self -imposed Codes of Conduct. They are just not observed and sadly are in the same class as Election promises.

……………………………………………………….

One personal experience of Harmony or Conflict and a possible via media.  I would call that dynamic tension, which may be the most productive relationship one could hope for. When I went to Amparai as GA in 1970 in encountered an issue of ‘contested territories’ with the Deputy Minister there. He was a tough guy; a little tin pot dictator.

At the beginning our relationship was very tense;  but at the end I would like to think there was mutual respect and regard. We both learned lessons.

[Editors note: Deshamanya Bradman Weerakoon is a retired senior bureaucrat of the Sri Lankan government. Mr. Weerakoon has the unique distinction of serving nine Sri Lankan heads of state in a career spanning across half a century. Click here for more information on his career. ]

• Abolition or reform of Executive Presidency in Sri Lanka?
• Not signing the Rome Statute is not enough! (A response to Ranil Wickremasinghe and Mangala Samaraweera)
• University academics: Statement on the Proposed 18th Amendment to the Constitution
• All Party Representative Committee (APRC) Final Report: Executive Summary
• A timeline of duplicity: Promises to abolish the Executive Presidency

All elections are important and these will be no exception. It is worth reminding that we are still in a post-war situation and far from the post-conflict one we ought to be in. What this requires is the prioritization of peace, reconciliation and unity and the firm commitment to ensure that the causes of ethnic conflict are not reproduced and sustained.  This means at least the rights of the IDPs as the litmus test for all else, a political settlement of the conflict and a reversal of the culture of impunity in respect of human rights along with facing up to the questions of whether there can be unity without reconciliation and reconciliation without accountability.  This is not all.  There are serious questions to be considered on the economic front with regard to employment and indebtedness – the real consequences of the fate of GSP Plus and the IMF loan – and most importantly in light of recent demonstrations, the ability of the system of education to meet the requirements of the economy.  And given Angulana, what happened to Nipuna Ratnayake and the Bambalapitiya drowning, the overarching issues of the Rule of Law, the supremacy of Constitution and the intentional violation of the Seventeenth Amendment.

Constitutional reform, at least in terms of the abolition or reform of the executive presidency will be on the agenda, as a consequence not so much of the requirements of governance but the emerging imperatives of regime survival and stability.  There is the danger that on this score, what is in store is the abolition of the form and title of the executive presidency with the transfer of its substantive powers to an “executive prime minister”.   The electoral system too, could be up for debate with the virtues of the ‘first-past –the post’ system and constituency MPs being eulogized to discredit proportional representation.

There is a crying need for a national debate on the future of the country and the issues on which the next presidential and general elections are to be fought.  The challenges ahead are far too serious to treat these elections merely as opportunities to register electoral approval, appreciation, admiration and gratitude for the defeat of the LTTE.  There has to be a tomorrow and a time when the war is truly behind us.  We need a plan to move towards that time and in order to design one, as many of us as willing and able must be part of that process.  An agenda for change and reform is critically needed and it will not come from the politicians who are trapped in fighting yesterday’s battles.

The island wide debate, discussion or conversation on change and reform is a vital and integral part of this.  Where however, through or on what medium or channel or site can it be conducted?

The obvious answer is the mainstream print and electronic media.  For a variety of reasons, very real and crucial constraints ranging from official displeasure, threat and sanction to self censorship, ideological disposition, market demands and problems of professionalism, the robust exchange of ideas called for will not happen here and not beyond the efforts of a persistent few, as required.  Moreover, since it is an exchange of ideas – a discussion, debate or conversation- that is called for, many voices need to he heard.  This is not about letters to the editor, about comment and observation alone but about participation and engagement with passion and conviction about the Sri Lanka of the future, we desire and deserve.

Citizens’ journalism and given its record as a forum for quality debate, Groundviews is ideally positioned to make a major contribution to this exercise in national rejuvenation and renaissance.  Is it not possible in the lead up to the elections that citizens use Groundviews to canvass their ideas for constitutional reform, governance, human rights and the economy and whatever else they see as constituting essential elements of an agenda for change and reform? The exchange could, but need not be time bound. As in the nature of a conversation it should be ongoing and active.

This would be a convincing demonstration of the strength and value of citizens’ journalism and its substantial utility in empowerment for peace, governance and human rights – An enabling facility for a functioning democracy.

• Abolition or reform of Executive Presidency in Sri Lanka?
• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
• 1,000 posts on Groundviews: Bearing witness, shaping peace
• Strange proposals and broken promises: Constitutional reform in Sri Lanka
• Strengthening democracy in Sri Lanka: An open invitation to generate fresh ideas

Over 2000 deaths post-2006. Post-tsunami, over 700,000 refugees upon a decimated Northeast bloated with bone and shades of displacement. Unidentified gunmen, parcel bombs, white vans, lurk in every shadow. From Devakumaran to Senpathi, infants in Kayts to civilians in Dehiwala, the value of human life varies inversely with rising prices of petrol and rice, rates of inflation and centralization. And a panoply of issues like the 17th amendment or justice for 17 aid workers dangling a top Temple Trees’ to-do list, in the contemporary context, no more a blunt sword of Damocles, unable to slice even warm butter. 

Meanwhile, the slide to war and isolationism continues. 

The opposition is unable to soften the hard line. Support for war continues to reinvigorate the ontology and ideology of a defensive Tiger. Newly empowered minorities compete for voice in a post-conflict East. The majority of the majority quasi-insulated by regionalisms endemic to Lanka’s war do not bat an eye, as the international community continues to serve up innocuous sanctions and rhetorical comforts to the bleeding. 

Square One is Eelam war IV, Black July, the before and after of each JVP insurrection and Eelam War. Aside from Indo-Lanka and the CFA periods where the center’s hand was pressurized by hands-on international engagement, conflict settlement logic in the domestic and international contexts more or less remains. 

Domestically, the slide to war has abetted a reversion to old predilections in politics. Regarding its international context, the slide to isolationism has reflected the incumbency’s reversion to an inward-looking equation of regime survival where the military option is the only option, democratic transformations in the East double as a human rights counterweight. 

In the domestic context, firstly, like before, ethnicity, not multiethnic nationalism, reigns hegemonic.
Some still hope a dead Prabhakharan and bullet-backed ballots in non-Sinhala areas despite displacement are panacea to a half-century quest for co-existence. Others await a crippling LTTE counter-strike to change the power balance, or to watch a post-Thopigalla East with Pillaiyan at the helm degenerate into a Pandora’s box of paramilitancy and political opportunism. And others neglecting semi-authoritarian trends in governance since the Mahinda Chintanaya’s dawn, optimistically await a resurrected constitutional democracy, the rehabilitation of a regime whose notion of justice is defined by a rule of law compromised by the role of lawlessness and cultures of impunity and political non-accountability. 

Secondly, in Eelam war IV the power-sharing dialogue which matured during the early cease-fire period has regressed to Eelam war I polarizations. 

It seems the shared understandings, GoSL-LTTE renormalization, confidence-building measures, areas of overlapping consensus, and peace dividends nurtured during the CFA between the protagonists were indeed not irreversible. In retrospect, the CFA, its benign legacy undone in half its time, was when it existed more or less the absence of war. Also, the symmetry of support for a GoSL which from CFA to Eelam war IV switched from pro-peace to pro-war, suggest that support is more tied to the government than to regime policy towards settlement. 

Thirdly, an albatross, the following logic of regime survival hovers again. 

As long as mortar shells in the North continue to out number half-coconut shells and ad hoc blasts in the south, the optics of regionalized victory and justifications for inflation and costs of living may be delivered to the dominant electorate, thereby sustaining consent for the military option. The support for war, the distribution of displacement and violence, the political opposition opting to mobilize on economic rather than anti-war and non-Sinhala humanitarian crises platforms in the southern electorate, are symptomatic of this logic. Also, the return to war, like the past, unilaterally disacknowledges the LTTE as a stakeholder in any process of political settlement, an understanding militarily and politically re-established before every historical transition to talks. Nevertheless, this changed strategic equilibrium is not necessarily unpalatable to Vanni leadership. As new UPFA-TMVP and UNP-SLMC combines enter the fray, the existence of the LTTE as a political and m
ilitary actor continues to breathe at the heart of all coalition politics island-wide. 

The regime’s thinking inter alia the international context to Eelam IV has been predominantly defined by isolationism, and sustaining and sanitizing the image and substance of a democratic South-East axis. 
Firstly, the policy of isolationism, elsewhere interpreted as “strategic deterrence”, comprised of commitments to militancy and humanitarian neglect, has gained momentum since 2005, its corrosive effects diluted by multipolarity. 

Consequently, the center has been able to thus far counterbalance prospects of long-term economic sanctions from the West and opprobrium vis-à-vis the humanitarian dimension by aligning with the “rise of the Rest” a la China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and so forth. Counterbalancing isolation from the West with alignment with the Rest has enabled the regime to extend buffer space to prosecute the military option. However, this either-or logic, that there is either alignment with the West or the Rest, in the Lankan context is arguably a false geostrategic dichotomy, born of coupling illiberal governance with a counter-terrorism anything-goes mentality. 

Complementary to this, post-2005, there has been an incremental politics of sustainable non-engagement by key international actors. This has developed in parallel to conflict escalation and the paralysis and dissolution of most peace process/good governance related bodies on the ground. As bodies such as the SLMM, COI, APRC, IIGEP weakened, as opprobrium and isolation from Western-based institutions intensified, with no dog in the fight, Co-Chairs members became more withdrawn, resorting to the soft power of rhetorical attacks, which in Lanka, seem to have little impact. This CFA-Eelam IV dual trend of growing international non-engagement and domestic institutional decay within the conflict structure, by negative inference, articulates among these international actors, an ossifying consensus. 

In the short, a political solution hinging on a military settlement to the ethnic conflict will be accommodated as a necessary evil to resolving Lanka’s national question, whether or not it answers demands of the minority community.

Secondly, the democratic image of the East for the regime has emerged opportune and vital for modulating eroding international legitimacy and stabilizing a South-East axis which will allow the reconcentration of military resources in the Northern theatre. However, given the open collusion with the Karuna-cum-Pillaiyan faction and documented electoral malfeasance during provincial elections, to what extent the mandates of regional democratic transformation and regional counter-insurgency overlapped, if at all, remains obscure. Also, democratizing the East has depended largely on the centrality of the anti-LTTE platform in the consolidation of multiparty political alliance. As a result, now the Muslim voice is divided. The Eastern Tamil voice has also divided twice before, in 2004, and last year, leading to a Pillaiyan-led TMVP. These splits in the Eastern minority voice have materialized in the spaces of negative peace, implying interdependence between the SLA-LTTE military balance of power and Eastern political unity. Also, the timing of division preceding elections does not stipulate involvement from the center, but a marriage of convenience between divided Eastern politics and trans-regime compulsions toward granting meaningful regional autonomy is difficult to neglect in toto. Overall, for an incumbency with alliances and populist support not untainted by Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarianism, the political utility of Muslim and Eastern Tamil autonomy in a regional context where the LTTE may become a non-factor, in a political context where preserving unitarism and implementing devolution remain at loggerheads, remains unclear. 

In the domestic and international contexts, the island’s slide to war and isolationism creates an increasingly inward-looking political environment which within multipolarity can sustain the military option, arguably casting the UNHRC rejection, an ironic blessing. 

Beneath, a GoSL-LTTE zero-sum game of blame continues, largely allergic to broader notions of causality, as developments on the ground are increasingly rationalized within a “War on Terror” prism which tends to distort more than it illumines. 

A language of peace – where “demilitarization” is also doublespeak for “military victory”, “precondition to conflict resolution” for “political settlement”- reframes overt policies of war. The LTTE threat has taken on a Manichean character, depicted as weaker yet omnipresent, diminished yet existential, a paradigm enabling the Northern campaign to legitimate deteriorating security and governance across the island. The political management of Tamil identity has also become more nuanced, with combatant and non-combatant more or less obfuscated in the North; Pillaiyan cadres, TMVP, SLA, child soldier, and civilians separated in the East. 

And myriad questions remain. 

Is the East truly “post-conflict”? Will democratization inspire integration into Colombo’s formal economy, or will development in the East replicate the post-1995 Jaffna model? How viable is the TMVP’s political ideology apart from pro-GoSL and anti-LTTE stances? 

Does fear and institutionalized apathy of the governed undermine the democratic integrity of their consent? In majoritarian democracy, is real power in Lanka exogenous to electoralism? 

Answers may emerge as regional situations unfold. 

However, if policy and discourse doesn’t return to issus of power-sharing and reconciliation, and if new balances between postindependence history and post-9/11 realities aren’t reached, the slide to war and isolationism will continue. 

Alongside, illiberalism and impunity, xenophobia and violence, will inexorably run like a knife across the throat of a Lankan post-CFA political climate which could have been. 

• FEDERALISM AND THE UNP
• Bala Tampoe on war and the erosion of democratic governance in Sri Lanka
• A circus has come to town
• Brotherhood Bloodshed Again?
• Consensus building for peace

The playful young boy said….. I am twelve years old and have been a victim of displacement. I am from Muttur and attended T/Ahathiyar Vidyualam in Kanguvelli. The conflict in Muttur displaced me from my original village and had to move into an IDP camp in Trincomalee. My family along with many others took refuge in this camp. For many days, I was playing in the camp with many other young friends and suddenly realized, I miss the normal life of attending a school. Playing all the time is a boring affair. I saw many children dressed in uniform attending school and had this urge to get back to school. I had no books or uniform with me, everything had been left behind.

After a few months, I attended a school close by to the IDP camp – T/Konalingam Maha Vidyalaya in Linganagar. After attending for one year, I had to change school once again and attended T/St Xavier School where I am now studying. This school does not have the facilities which my initial school had. The change in schools and the situation has greatly affected my studies. I now think how much I miss my original school, which with its basic comforts was my next home. I have lost my teachers, friends, my first home and the other home (village school) as well.

The camp life does not allow me to have my freedom. We are all together, cannot study and feel an outsider in this school. I cannot leave the camp except for school which is about one hour travel one way. There is a tutory close to the camp and I see many children attending for catch-up or tuition classes, I presume. I too need this facility as the present school does not have the capacity to teach us as expected. I wish I was one of those students attending the tutory, neatly dressed. I do not have a proper uniform to attend school either.

I do not attend school when it’s raining and do not have the encouragement either. I want a decent education and study hard as this would be my only way out. I just want to be home…. Walking to school… carefree with my friends… back in my village….

Can you make this possible? The field officer was lost for words.

• GRIEVANCES OF AN IDP
• “I pray God that no one in this world should face the hardships, faced by my child and me”
• “We are not willing to go back to our village, till a permanent solution for the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka”
• I will not return to my Village
• War IDPs

“An alliance of Tamil political parties has been formed to contest the upcoming local council elections in Batticaloa, EPDP leader and Minister Douglas Devananda said yesterday adding that a final decision on the party symbol and other details would be decided upon within the next few days.

Minister Devananda said the alliance was formed between the EPDP, TMVP (Pillayan faction), PLOTE and EPRLF (Varathar faction) following an invitation extended by the EPDP and an agreement was reached to that effect at a meeting held in Batticaloa on Saturday. “The alliance was formed following the meeting held between the area political leaders of the Tamil parties in Batticaloa on Saturday. The alliance will focus on the rights of Tamils in Batticaloa and the development of the district,” Minister Devananda told the Daily Mirror quoting a joint statement signed by the representatives of the parties at the weekend meeting.”

While the EPDP spokesman confirmed the same story to me, TMVP’s Pillayan however said that a decision had not been reached. He said that though such a discussion had taken place the TMVP position would be stated once a decision had been made.
A TMVP source told me that there were concerns that EPDP and the other parties were seen as mainly from the North while TMVP identified themselves as from the East. He added that the TMVP might not have the freedom to do political work in the north, if the situation was reversed.

• Karuna Leaves The Country
• TMVP Protest In Batticaloa Today
• Impact of the Batticaloa Conflict and the situation of Muslims
• Brotherhood Bloodshed Again?
• Analysis of how Jaffna voted and why the EPDP feels defeated in Sri Lanka’s first post-war elections

The TMVP also wants solutions to problems faced by people being resettled in the East, for example in terms of lack of jobs, all of which will go into a signed letter to be delivered to the President.

TMVP Spokesman Azad Moulana says they expect 25,000 people from three regions of the east to voice their protest and gather at the stadium, which is scheduled to start at 9.30am.

They may also try to bring together Karuna supporters to show their support for the above cause whether voluntarily or by some degree of force.

The Karuna-Pillayan struggle is unfolding quite rapidly, as readers are no doubt aware, and the latest I have gathered, which I thought I would put down here, is that Karuna cadres are restricted to Ampara, while Pillayan seems to have control of Trincomalee and Batticaloa areas and of the TMVP.

A few Karuna cadres are also in the Kiran areas, which is the hometown of Karuna. (TMVP has a council which Pillayan now apparently has control of).
A reporter friend from the East estimates there to be about a couple of hundred Karuna cadres and a couple of thousand Pillayan cadres, but that info is sketchy.
Given that elections are in the offing early next year, there is a complex power struggle going on ahead of the polls. The military and government in the East will likely support the above protest which shows opposition to the LTTE.

On the day of the budget vote, after the second reading, last month, the TMVP (Pillaiyan) said they were in discussions with the TNA to work for the public good in the east. They said they would make an announcement depending on the way the TNA voted on the budget.

TNA MPs denied they held such talks and voted against the budget, very likely going counter to the wishes of the TMVP.

Today’s protest could reveal more of what is going on. It will be good if readers with more information can post their material here.

• Any More Separation For TMVP?
• Karuna Leaves The Country
• Impact of the Batticaloa Conflict and the situation of Muslims
• Alliance Of Parties In The East?
• Closer Look At Operation To Capture Thoppigala