I want to start my talk by bringing to the fore the experiences of another, which was seen as an intractable conflict – the apartheid struggle in South Africa.

In 1984, Mandela single handedly launched negotiations with the Afrikaner government. His reasons were simple and unambiguous.

There are many people who feel that it is useless and futile for us to continue talking peace and non-violence — against a government whose only reply is savage attacks on an unarmed and defenseless people. And I think the time has come for us to consider, in the light of our experiences at this day at home, whether the methods which we have applied so far are adequate.

He knew that for lasting peace he had to focus on what he had in common with those who were persecuting him.

Mandela said: We need to make peace with our enemies and not with our friends.

I strongly feel that this applies to all communities of people living in any country.

Are there any experiences that we can learn from this story of one of the world’s greatest moral leaders?

I think there is a lot to learn. Some of the major lessons that can be drawn out from the experiences of the South African struggle are:

Never let go of your dreams

Be courteous even to your enemies

Talk with those you are in strife with

You can negotiate with even the most intractable and difficult people

Don’t indulge in ‘them versus us’ thinking

I think this story also shows us the direction towards peace and national reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

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It is in this political light I wish to address the material realties facing the inhabitants of the island.

At the outset can I state that I am not addressing you as a Sinhalese, but as a fellow human being regardless of whether you are Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim, Burgher or member of any other community.

The Current Context

On 19 May 2009, President of Sri Lanka claimed military victory over the LTTE.

Given this victory was achieved through a brutal military onslaught; it seemed to have engendered immediate hopes of an era of reconciliation.

Many overseas countries including the United States commended the military defeat of separatism and went onto praise the Sri Lankan government for moving towards peace and making efforts to rebuild the country.

Though 240,000 internally displaced people have been allowed to resettle, many of them are still struggling to seek out a living.

More than 60,000 of them are still held in detention camps behind barbed wire.

In the north and the east, the government is said to have placed heavy emphasis on the development of infrastructure.

It is good to develop the economic sustainability of the people, living there under difficult intricate circumstances, yet we are aware that there may well be other agendas driving this infrastructural push.

Reports coming out of the country do not reflect a genuine desire or commitment for reconciliation by the government and their supporters.

The focus of the ordinary people living in war ravaged areas seems to be on the need to address the problems of the thousands who have lost their lives and limbs in the course of the war and to help their families to cope with the disaster of separation and loss.

Provision of employment opportunities and development of their livelihood have become major issues affecting their day to day survival.

Peace and reconciliation

Sri Lankan society is fractured along many fault lines.

It is not surprising to hear about various manifestations of racism within the Sri Lankan social fabric, which I consider as expressions of social exclusion.

A policy based on social inclusion has to fulsomely deal with not only such manifestations of racism, but also with poverty.

To my mind, any analysis of peace and reconciliation should commence with an analysis of economic injustice.

The government states that it aims to provide the benefits of peace in the form of a dividend to all its citizens with economic development spread throughout the island.

However, the economic picture seems much bleaker than the government admits.

The latest report I read was about the recommencement of blanket registration of Tamils by Police in many parts of Colombo where a sizeable Tamil community lives.

These harsh and arbitrary measures, 14 months after the end of the war, have created a sense of insecurity and injustice.

It is a move away from any serious effort towards peace and reconciliation.

Social exclusion and social inclusion

The measures the government has adopted do not seem to include a policy calculus with a genuine desire to address the issues that led to the ongoing conflict.

Over the years, a system of government has been built in Sri Lanka in which there is no accountability and transparency.

Security considerations and military operations are given the highest priority curtailing individual and group rights of all people in Sri Lanka.

Social exclusion in Sri Lanka can be partly defined as the living experience of the Tamil community because of the comprehensive policy calculus implemented for shutting them out of the socio-economic, political and cultural systems of the mainstream society.

Such measures caused and will continue to cause economic, social, political and cultural disadvantage.

The National question

The failure of successive governments to address social exclusion brought about alienation of communities and resulted in military conflicts both in the south and the north.

Both Sinhala and Tamil youth passionately contested these issues and sought alternative ‘other’ responses and failed miserably more than once.

If these tragedies are not to be repeated then the scope of formal equality defined in the laws, the constitution, and the human rights codes in Sri Lanka must proclaim the equality of all citizens living in Sri Lanka.

Citizens should be equally entitled to certain rights typically associated with a democracy.

The war between the government and the LTTE brought about a whole new set of tragic issues of helplessness, death and destruction to life and property.

Nevertheless, the desire for a fair and just political solution and peace with justice for those who are socially excluded has not come to an end.

The whole society including the political parties, their leaderships, communities of people and their leaders are divided on the issue of a political solution to the national question.

The standard prescription has been to find a structure of power sharing through devolution and regional autonomy.

Power sharing will weaken both the social forces that favour internal subjugation as well as those favouring separation.

This can only succeed in an environment of a strong leadership committed to power sharing arrangements.

Such an environment requires the building of a culture that treats the other with dignity, respect and fairness.

The three decades long separatist armed conflict and five decades long and ongoing political conflict were based on social exclusion and discriminatory measures adopted against the Tamil community.

The government does not seem to be pursuing a path to develop its long-promised political settlement to this issue.

The government seems not interested even in acknowledging or implementing what is already incorporated within the country’s Constitution.

Though such measures may not provide the Tamil community with what they have been asking for, the 13^th amendment, if fully implemented may represent a certain measure of regional devolution.

Since the recently concluded Presidential and parliamentary elections, the government and President do not seem to have any urgency to provide a commitment or leadership to implementing at least a measure of regional autonomy.

Nationalist claims

The current political conflict cannot be oversimplified to a simple linear equation between development and peace.

While the effects of the war such as death, destruction, injury, displacement and underdevelopment were mainly borne by the Tamil and Muslim communities living in the north and east, the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims in the south were also affected by the war and the resultant economic hardships.

As there is no memory of peaceful co-existence within the post-1983 Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim generations, it is not surprising that they look upon each other with hostility.

In my view, their thoughts are fathomed not by any rational analysis, but by the omnipresent rhetoric of historical and deep-rooted ethnic and religious differences.

This rhetoric has made these relationships more and more hostile towards reconciliation.

The political elite of the island who have made use of and are still making use of those historical, deep rooted ethno-linguistic and religious differences to consolidate their economic, social and family privileges and interests has done extremely well in ruining the harmonious relations the society enjoyed before.

The failure of the socio-economic and cultural systems in Sri Lanka needs to be understood in this context.

On the one hand, despite the political attempts to resolve the conflict through peace talks and cease-fires on more than one occasion, I believe that certain sections of the security forces assisted by certain ultra-nationalist forces ruthlessly undermined such efforts.

On the other hand, the LTTE never intended to abandon their goal of a separate independent state comprising the north and east of the island.

The Sinhala majority population wanted to annihilate such an attempt at any cost.

Muslims claim that they are entitled to their traditional land in the east.

They claim that they were subjected to targeted violence and ethnic cleansing by the LTTE.

Most of the rural Sinhalese only came to know the conflict through the loss of life and injury of their kith and kin enlisted in the armed forces or killed or maimed as a result of bombings.

The relationships among the ordinary Muslim, Tamil and Sinhala people have been seriously damaged by the armed conflict.

During and after the election of President Rajapaksa’s government, the alienation amongst the diverse communities of people has reached a crescendo.

So the opposition to achieving reconciliation through power sharing also has reached a climax.

Yet, the Sinhala people including Sinhala Diaspora also stands divided not only by their political affiliations but also by the issues related to their religion, caste, gender, language, class and individual and collective experiences.

The Tamil people including Tamil Diaspora also seem to have deep fractures.

However, I am not here to talk about those divisions; except to note that after the military defeat of the LTTE, these fissures seem to have become more apparent and overt.

It is also evident that the majority of Tamils living in the north and east and the majority of Tamil Diaspora still seem to insist on a rights based approach to a fair, just and equitable treatment.

Recent reports indicate that death squads are still operating in the island.

Incidentally, the subjects of these death squads do not extend to the family, friends and fellow travelers of the ruling elite.

What a coincidence?

The country’s highest court discarded the vital role international human rights law and international human rights bodies played and need to play in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.

The pledges the Sri Lanka government made to the United Nations are yet to be realized.

Yet, the UNHCR sees vast improvements in the island’s human rights situation.

Coincidently, the United Nation’s effort to investigate alleged war crimes by the parties to the conflict seems to have been sabotaged by the very government that the UN says, has improved its human rights record!

The international pressure exerted on the Sri Lankan political leadership through diplomatic and economic measures does not seem to have worked, mainly due to the military collaboration between the Sri Lankan government and a diversity of regimes ranging from capitalist to socialist and communist and also those in between.

The government’s economic partnership with regimes like China, Iran and Venezuela will reduce Sri Lanka’s economic dependence on Europe and the USA.

These are some of the features I can see in the local and global relationships relevant to Sri Lanka.

Is there a way forward?

The current socio-political and economic environment in the island does only provide an extremely narrow space to achieve peace and reconciliation among the communities of people, to develop a fair and just framework to address the national question.

This is because we have reached the lowest ebb in terms of relationship with each other.

Therefore, in the short term I cannot imagine achieving peace and reconciliation through the development of a framework based on fairness and justice.

This less than optimistic situation leads to certain pointers.

To achieve reconciliation, I strongly believe that we, the diaspora who are originally from Sri Lanka, may have a better chance and opportunity for mutual interaction; though even in that space, such interaction seems extremely limited.

Before the end of the military aspect of the conflict, the Diaspora was bogged down in extreme positions with no interaction or consultation with each other.

The Diaspora on its own need not try and impose a political agenda on the Tamil people living in Sri Lanka without genuinely consulting their wishes and expectations.

For decades, they have been kept down due to social exclusion practiced within and without, and also due to the armed conflict.

Nevertheless, as far as I am aware currently there is no such process afoot.

A principled human rights based approach could commence with arrangements to build a common movement to bring justice towards victims who have been subjected to a diversity of injustice and to redress the issues that led to three decades long armed conflict.

What I emphasize here is that trust building between the peoples need to start by making certain compromises that need to be worked out through political dialogue and negotiations with each other.

This raises the pertinent question: can such compromises be made under the current circumstances of human rights violations in the island?

As the short term objective of the ruling elite seems to be consolidation of their political power for safeguarding their economic, social and family interests and privileges, a principled or rights based approach to resolve the issues of Tamil people cannot be expected to materialize from the elite.

Furthermore, the current national and international political environment is not conducive for any armed opposition.

Yet, I believe that there is still space for non-violent political activities to build a strong and wide opposition movement.

For this to progress, engagement with diverse organizations that have been campaigning for protection of human and democratic rights of the people of Sri Lanka is necessary and essential.

Such organizations may include political parties and organizations, trade unions and non-governmental organizations.

If such political action does not materialize, rebuilding the fragmented social relationships in Sri Lanka will get much harder with each passing day.

For an agenda based on social inclusion to have an effect, we need to have space to discuss the many varieties of social oppression and exclusion prevalent in Sri Lanka and in the Diaspora.

There is no way we can move straight from a society based on social exclusion to a society based on social inclusion, because such a transition is not possible without a thorough social conversation and analysis.

Such a conversation and analysis require parallel efforts of critical examination of hierarchies of social oppression.

It also requires promotion of a program of transition to combine together the variety of unrelated and dissimilar movements that struggle against oppression, inequality and injustice.

Such social movements could be bound together by a kind of inclusion that would lead to the creation of a more just and equitable society.

For this to occur, consultative, participative, democratized, open consensus building is necessary.

Thus, a conversation on social inclusion can provide a coherent critical examination of the multiple forms of social and economic injustices and the concomitant institutional policy and program calculus.

So I believe the way forward for peace and reconciliation lies in exploring the potential for rebuilding inclusive relationships among the diversity of people through the existing and available dialogue and interaction mechanisms within communities both local and diasporic.

There should be attempts to expand such possibilities to create more space for dialogue and interaction.

However, such dialogue and interaction require a different and alternate understanding of socio-economic and cultural space, citizenship rights and necessary pre-conditions for social cohesion and inclusion.

This requires challenging the dominant Sinhala and Tamil discourse of social exclusion and stressing the politics of difference that needs to put issues of inequality and social and economic justice at the heart of the issue of social inclusion.

It is in this light I appeal to those who value democracy, freedom and liberty to actively show that they oppose the repressive political culture in Sri Lanka.

They need to exert pressure on the state to negotiate towards a meaningful and just power-sharing arrangement.

Sinhala and Tamil expatriates that helped perpetuate the conflict need to make a positive contribution to its resolution by engaging in dialogue within their community and with other communities.

They need to become drivers of this paradigm shift by creating a new reality through their interactions with each other.

This is not without historical precedent. It happened in South Africa and it can happen in Sri Lanka.

Thank you.

[Authors note: This was a speech delivered recently by me in Melbourne, Australia]

• Last comment on Sri Lanka: Is the war really over?
• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
• Lionel Bopage: Reflections on the Current Situation in Sri Lanka
• Voices of Reconciliation Radio – New Content
• Engage the Diaspora

Released exclusively on Groundviews, this is a composite document compiled by Yogarajan and Kariapper and made public by them (read the full background to this document in their introduction).

Please note that as Nizam Kariapper pointed out to Groundviews, there is a mistake in the first page of this version of the report – the reference to June 2010 should read as June 2009.

• Download the complete report here.
• Download the executive summary of the report here.

• All Party Representative Committee (APRC) Final Report: Executive Summary
• Visualising Mahinda Chintanaya 2010: The President’s election manifesto
• The Government’s “Eastern Rising”
• Groundviews back online, with new features and enhanced for mobile phones
• Abolition or reform of Executive Presidency in Sri Lanka?

It was seen in a flag being celebrated equally by all races. Don’t be mistaken. A black and an Afrikaner were not spotted hugging each other, but the unity can be felt. Not pumped up, not voiced through news conferences and loud mouths in august assemblies.  The feeling gives you gut assurance that we are seeing the real thing. Imperfect, but it is open not incognito. It is recognizable and touchable. In the country where some of the most hideous crimes were committed, both in the name of racial purity and in the name of the emancipation of the oppressed, the human spirit is on the mend.

With the pessimist it can be agreed that it is not perfect. The extremist voices are there; the voices of hatred are not totally stilled as evidenced in the violent killing of Eugene Terreblanche the avid white supremacist.  Some even tried to make this a declaration of war by  blacks against whites. In the days prior to the world cup South African Police said white supremacists planned bombs in black areas. The president condemned the killing. From our own experience we know that such condemnation could mean something or nothing at all.

Presidential statements are immaterial when a process is on the roll. A process, which has caught the imagination of different strata’s of South African society. The word reconciliation is so perverted theses days. It is used as a means to obtaining funding nationally and organizationally. It is used to keep the prince in the palace and the poor man at the gate provided they are not throwing obscenities or hand grenades at each other.

Despite years since the end of conflict, the process of healing is in the kindergarten stage in South Africa, maybe because there is a ring of authenticity to it. The hope cannot be missed however even by the most skeptical. It might be best captured by the words of the song that was reverberating through the airwaves during the world cup.

“When I get older, I will be stronger
. They’ll call me freedom, just like a Waving Flag”

And I sat on my couch, got drawn into the crowds watching the enthralling soccer, but I cried. Tears of envy pouring down as I saw what I would love to see happening closer home.

Joanna, is their any hope and inspiration that you could give Colombo?

• Freedom of Speech, Violent Fascism, Democracy, Nick Griffin and Mahinda Rajapakse
• Spoil Sports, or an Oppportunity for a Dignified Exit
• The long wait for a President…
• Death at Noon
• The heartbeat of my country

This interview features Dr. A. C. Visvalingam, President, Citizen’s Movement for Good Governance. I ask him about his advocacy and activism in Sri Lanka, both during war and post-war. Mr. Visvalingam bemoans the fact that a number of articles, despite close ties to Editors and journalists, did not appear in the newspapers, and also speaks of the corporate sector’s risk averse nature especially around content produced that is critical of government and governance. He also speak about the need to introduce civic education in schools to bring about a greater awareness over the role and responsibilities of citizens. He goes on to articulate how he feels a change in Sri Lanka’s structures of governance can be brought about, what urgent constitutional reforms are necessary and what CIMOGG is doing in this regard.

• A Donkey doing a Dog’s work: The Grade 1 entrance fiasco and the Chief Justice
• The Indo-Lanka Accord – Some reflections 20 years hence
• The Weligama Declaration
• Prabakaran’s Role in Tamil National Struggle: Interview with Shanthi Sachithanandan
• Lessons in Leadership

Dr. Marasinghe’s suggestion, in turn, raises greater problems, and is a risk that Sri Lanka cannot afford to take at this stage.

The unresolved ‘problem within a problem’

An AO from the ICJ, even if it is to be ‘favourable’ to Sri Lanka, would not be one which addresses the root of the problem; the problem of accountability and investigations. Dr. Marasinghe detects only the ‘international’ problem (i.e. the appointment of the Panel by the UNSG), and not this enduring domestic/internal problem of the inability to carry out investigations. Why so? It is because the Government, for quite some time now, believed that there was no problem, i.e. that there is absolutely no need to seriously investigate any of the allegations of IHL/HR violations because it argued that no such violations occurred during the last stages of the conflict. It is not very clear whether this position has changed, and one awaits in this regard the recommendations of the ‘Lessons Learnt’ Commission on the issue of ‘investigations.’ Even the response to the US State Department’s report is yet to be published (one could only ask ‘haven’t we replied yet?’ – as Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha MP seems to have asked, as mentioned during a recent interview with Radio Australia).

If Sri Lanka had resolved this problem, neither the West nor the UNSG could have raised any concerns regarding ‘accountability’. As long as that problem remains unresolved, there is nothing much to be gained by approaching the ICJ and seeking an AO (which is not legally binding).

UN Charter

Dr. Marasinghe seems to believe that the UNSG, by establishing the Panel, has violated certain specific provisions of the UN Charter, especially Articles 33 and 34 of the Charter. But, how could the UNSG violate these provisions when the establishment of the Panel has nothing to do with the subject matter covered under Articles 33 and 34?

Articles 33 and 34 come within Chapter VI entitled ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’. Article 33(1) basically states that parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first seek solutions (by negotiations, enquiry, mediation etc.) or other peaceful means of their own choice. Article 33(2) states that the Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means. Article 34 states that: the Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

These provisions refer, in the main, to ongoing disputes which are likely to threaten international peace and security. But what the UNSG has done is to appoint a Panel, one year after the conflict. So the UNSG’s clear argument would be that there is neither a dispute, nor one which threatens international peace and security, and therefore, Articles 33 and 34 are simply of no relevance. Even if one is to argue, as Dr. Marasinghe has done, that the panel appointed by the UNSG is ‘international’, Chapter VI doesn’t broadly cover the unique Sri Lankan case (The better provision to have cited would have been Article 100(1), of Chapter XV).

Now, it should not be forgotten that there are serious concerns with regard to the mandate of this particular Panel, or rather concerns regarding the understanding of the mandate by the members of the Panel. But this does not necessarily mean that specific provisions of the UN Charter have been violated (an accusation which gives rise to a serious legal argument), because the UN Charter does not seem to cover what a UNSG could do with regard to issues of ‘accountability’ in a ‘post-war’ situation when the conflict has ended and there is no dispute whatsoever between the conflicting parties. It is a problem of the largely outdated UN Charter, and this is exactly why the UNSG was able to appoint a panel and draft a mandate which seemed to please all actors concerned (the West, the panel, and even Sri Lanka, by stating that the Panel is available only as a resource), and still survive without any serious or strong condemnation (Note, in this regard, that even though news reports stated that Russia had ‘slammed’ the UNSG, Russia concludes the statement by pointing out that it hopes that the UNSG Panel would not complicate the investigation being conducted by the Sri Lankan authorities. That, I would argue, is good enough for the UNSG to carry on with the process).  If the UNSG-Panel had been established during the time of armed conflict, i.e. before May 2009, then certainly a strong legal argument could have been raised. But this is not the case. Therefore, when the provisions of the Charter are so vague and unclear, it is not in the best interest of Sri Lanka to take the matter to the ICJ.

Reaching the ICJ: the political process

Another factor Dr. Marasinghe ignores is the political process involved in taking the question to the ICJ. Dr. Marasinghe has not clarified this issue. The impression the reader gets is that any State could easily approach the ICJ and seek an AO on any legal question. No.

Article 96 (1) of the UN Charter states very clearly that it is the General Assembly or the Security Council which may request the ICJ to give an AO on any legal question. Article 96(2) states that other organs of the UN and specialized agencies may also make similar requests. Thereafter, Article 65(1) of the Statute of the ICJ affirms this position in stating that the ICJ may give an AO at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.  Therefore, it is clear that Sri Lanka first needs to win over a majority of the General Assembly (in particular), and without such support, its efforts would not succeed. In any authoritative work on the ICJ’s jurisprudence (especially by the foremost authority on the ICJ, Shabtai Rosenne) one could find how requests for AOs have been made in the past (eg. Res. ES-10/14 of December 2003, adopted by 90 votes to 8 with 74 abstentions as regards the question of Israel’s illegal construction of the wall, Res. 49/75K of December 1994 adopted by 78 votes to 43 with 38 abstentions, as regards the question of illegality of nuclear weapons, etc. etc.).

But is this possible for Sri Lanka? Even the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has been so far reluctant to come out with a statement critical of UNSG’s decision, and in addition to this, the impact of Minister Weerawansa’s fast has been an extremely negative one, further damaging Sri Lanka’s credibility in the eyes of her friends.

Furthermore, what is interesting to note is that certain members of the NAM (as numerous news reports suggest) are observing this development from a different perspective. While Sri Lanka may be adversely affected, the precedent that the UNSG has set is extremely interesting and useful for some of the NAM members, because they could now exert pressure on the UNSG and request him to take similar action re. other cases: e.g. Israel (This, I would argue, is the only positive outcome of this whole exercise). So, even if the NAM supports Sri Lanka in taking the question to the ICJ, there is no guarantee that the NAM will be overly worried by the outcome, because given NAM’s interests, some of its members could benefit from any kind of AO that the ICJ decides to deliver. These are some of the considerations not raised by Dr. Marasinghe.

ICJ: the politics of law

Another serious factor that needs to be noted is the ‘politics of law’, or rather, the politics of the ICJ.  What makes approaching the ICJ risky is that one cannot be sure of what the Judges would state in response to a question as one posed by Dr. Marasinghe. There is certainly no guarantee that all of them would clearly hold that the UNSG has exceeded his powers. One reason is because, as pointed out above, the Charter provisions are unclear. (And do not forget, it was the ICJ which held in its Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 that in view of the current state of international law it cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence. So holding that the law is unclear is nothing new!).  Even if the majority holds that the provisions are clear and that the UNSG has exceeded his powers, what would the impact be of a strong Dissenting Opinion of any single judge? And in such a scenario, wouldn’t there be judges who would come up with such individual opinions?

Take the composition of the court, and the ‘geo-politics’ surrounding the Sri Lankan issue. The US, for instance, has publicly welcomed the establishment of the Panel. In such a context, could one expect the US judge on the ICJ bench, Judge Buergenthal, seriously hold that the UNSG had no power to appoint a panel which advices him, and thereby ridicule the US’s decision to support the establishment of the Panel? Take US’s closest ally, the UK. Now, the present UK judge on the bench is not Judge Higgins (as Dr. Marasinghe seems to imply when he refers to her as “the judge”), but Judge Christopher Greenwood who is a strong defender of the UK government and its policy on humanitarian intervention. Judge Greenwood (then, as Prof. Greenwood, QC), strongly defended the NATO intervention in Kosovo and in this regarded defended the UK government in the ICJ as UK’s counsel, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sought provisional measures directing a halt to the NATO operations (he held similar controversial views concerning the Iraq invasion, and in this regard see The Evening Standard report titled ‘Easy Justice for QC who took us to war in Iraq’). Now, given the politics surrounding the issue and the response of the West with regard to the establishment of the UNSG Panel, how would these judges approach the issue, what would they say?

It is due to the above – which seem to raise more problems (and not any meaningful solution) for Sri Lanka – that I fail to agree with the suggestion proposed by Dr. Marasinghe.

Conclusion

There was, and there is, a simple answer to these numerous ‘international’ problems which seem to be piling up: the investigation of all serious allegations of humanitarian and human rights law violations. This was not done, and whether it would be done in the future is unknown. But as long as that problem remains unresolved, different and difficult problems will continue to trouble Sri Lanka. Going in search of Advisory Opinions to The Hague without seriously addressing that enduring domestic problem is of little use. In fact, going anywhere near The Hague could be pretty dangerous.

(Kalana Senaratne, LL.B, LL.M (University College London), is a post-graduate research student at the University of Hong Kong)

• Not signing the Rome Statute is not enough! (A response to Ranil Wickremasinghe and Mangala Samaraweera)
• Making Foreign Policy on the Street
• On Sri Lanka’s accession to the ICCPR Optional Protocol
• Is Sri Lanka in danger of being held accountable by the International Criminal Court?
• THE CONTINUING VIOLATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: YET MORE UNCONVINCING EXCUSES

One of the more refined gratifications in my life is the friendship of a few renowned intellectuals like Richard Falk, Emeritus Professor of International Law and Policy at Princeton, and the occasional receipt from him of work in progress. The other day’s email contained three scintillating draft essays, two of which I have finished reading and one that I have commented on.  This time however, what is a guaranteed treat also gave me cause for sorrow. A closely and creatively argued piece on Threat Diplomacy contained an important segment on the World Court’s judgment on nuclear weapons and war, and made several references to Justice Weeramantry’s dissenting judgment.  I had known from conversations that Richard Falk had known and liked CG Weeramantry from encounters when they were much younger, but I felt a twinge of sadness that so fine a mind as to be acknowledged by so renowned an intellectual (almost a sage) as Prof Falk, has not, as far as I know, been consulted by the Sri Lankan leadership at a time that the Sri Lankan state is and has been facing complex challenges of international law. This is so despite several recommendations by me to that effect to the highest authorities, and prompt assent which was never followed up or implemented.

A prophet is without honour only in his own land, says the Bible, and this is true of Judge Weeramantry, whose stances, when taken together, constitute a principled and distinctly ethical ontology: anti-terrorist (Lockerbie), anti-nuclear war (dissenting judgment of ’96), pro-sovereignty and international law (critiques of NATO Kosovo bombing, Iraq War), pro-human rights (definitive three volume work) and inter-ethnic, multi-religious peace-building (UNESCO prize, Weeramantry foundation).  We have therefore, the best stance for Sri Lankan ‘being in the world’, what I choose to call (given their close friendship and intellectual congruency) the Kadirgamar-Weeramantry outlook, approach or model. We also have at least two paradigmatic choices for Sri Lankan engagement with the world order: Weeramantry or Weerawansa?

What pains me most is not that the Sri Lankan state has not availed itself of the counsel of Judge Weeramantry, but that it has gone in precisely the opposite direction of the counsel he has publicly given. It has ignored and contradicted the wisdom of this sagacious man on matter of the greatest national importance for this and future generations of Sri Lankans. In the post-war year, Sri Lanka has proceeded far more in consonance with the narrow views of raucous lawyer-ideologues than with the counsel of that greatest of Sri Lankan jurists.

Shortly after the victory over the Tigers last year, Judge Weeramantry wrote a two part essay which I read in the Daily Mirror.  He advised us that we were at a crucial turning point, and brought to our attention the lessons of history as represented by two contradictory models of post war policy architecture, which brought two enormously varying sets of consequences. The first was in the aftermath of World War I, when a punitive ‘victors peace’, the Treaty of Versailles, was designed and imposed on defeated Germany. The result ten years later was the emergence of fascism, in fifteen its triumph and in twenty a terrible new war. The second model was the post World War II peace. Though the destruction of Germany and Japan were the most awful (and in the latter case, unprecedented in human history), these two states became peaceful and firm partners of the Western alliance thanks to a generous and far sighted policy, based on the recognition of the mistakes committed after the First World War. The Marshall Plan and the creation of a free, prosperous liberal society with political freedom permanently pacified these countries and turned their citizens into firm partners of the West. This was the cement of the security alliances, pacts and network of bases that locked these areas firmly into the Western strategic architecture.

Judge Weeramantry warned us explicitly against the Versailles spirit and a ‘victor’s peace’, and urged us to adopt the post WWII model of sensitivity, liberalism, generosity, political freedom and alliance building. But have we done so? Are we doing so? Or are we heading in exactly the opposite direction?

In a critical review of my first book, Prof AJ Wilson, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of New Brunswick and son-in law of SJV Chelvanayagam, kindly ventured the opinion that “Dayan… is perhaps the last liberal thinker among the Sinhalese” (Sunday Island, March 23, 1997, p14, 16). If I am a ‘liberal thinker’ then I am a liberal Realist who supports the establishment of a sufficient and permanent Sri Lankan military presence on state land in the North and East. However, I am also wary of the establishment of permanent housing for military families and the acquisition of privately owned land for that purpose.

The reason for my support and opposition is security of the state and society. Sri Lanka is one country and the state has every right to establish armed encampments and deploy its armed forces wherever it sees fit. I have no problem with the exercise of that right. Yet, just as every other right it must be exercised prudently, because the unity of Sri Lanka as a single country is not the only aspect of Sri Lanka’s reality that must be taken into account. Ours is also a multiethnic country with a historically evolved and stable ethno-demography. The Tamils consider the Northern Province as their ancestral lands, the land of their grandfathers and great grandfathers.  I have met seventh generation Malaysian Tamils who are emotionally attached to Kokuvil as their native place, where their roots run back to.

The establishment of a strong military presence is necessary because the state and the citizenry can no longer be suckered. The Sri Lankan state must internalise the military lessons of all the wars it has had to fight in the North East and deploy troops in a manner that the area is strategically as impregnable as is possible to render it. The Sri Lankan military deployments in the North and East must never be vulnerable again, militarily or logistically. They must be capable of safeguarding our outer borders as well as preventing/pre-empting terrorism and low intensity insurgency.

The Sri Lankan military configuration in the North and East must be capable of deterring or fighting and winning future wars. But it must not be the cause or catalyst for future conflict.  That would be self-defeating because it would not enhance national security; it would undermine it.

Had Sri Lanka either been bereft of an internal ethno-national question (the Tamil question)  or had the Sri Lankan military been multiethnic in composition,  the acquisition of private land for high security zones and permanent housing for military families would not have been so serious a problem.  We are dealing with the reality of a mono-ethnic, monolingual, mono-religious military establishing permanent housing for their families in a differently mono-ethnic area with a high degree of sub-nationalist consciousness.

There would be those who argue that a mono-ethnic army was able, against all expectation, to win a war against terrorism and separatism on the home turf of the insurgents. This is not strictly true. The achievement of the Sri Lankan armed forces was both greater than that and different from it.  The Sri Lankan army defeated a rival secessionist army, a powerful militia, not a guerrilla insurgency or terrorist network. The Tigers had long outgrown those stages and hypertrophied to the socio-politically unsustainable level of a parallel armed force, fighting a quasi-conventional war.

Today, the state must deploy the armed forces in the North and East in a manner that deters and prevents future conflict and rather than sows the seeds for it, either in the forms of terrorism, guerrilla cells or unarmed civic resistance. The establishment of permanent military bases strictly within state (‘Crown’) land is doubtless imperative to guarantee the first objective, but the acquisition of private land and the settlement of military families could trigger the latter. The permanent settlement of military families means places of religious worship, schools, shops, cinemas, services, etc, and the first sign of protest would also mean widening the zone, narrowing access to the civilians of the area, perhaps new access roads and the proliferation of checkpoints. This may seem an excellent method of population mixing, but that works as a method o conflict transformation only if population movement is as a result of natural economic factors, not unilateral state policy.  The Tamils in Wellawatte were not brought there as part of state policy.

These ideas for the North and East are not new—and nor is the critique. A read through the Lanka Guardian and The Island’s ‘Kautilya’ column of the 1980s would show the repeated warnings by Mervyn de Silva, who was, among other things, widely acknowledged as the country’s leading expert on Israel/Palestine and the Middle East, about the ideas of a wing of the JR Jayewardene government of the time. These ideas, identified with then Minister of National Security but also shared by the President’s son and security advisor Ravi Jayewardene, located in and derived from an irrelevant external matrix, were dangerously inapplicable to Sri Lanka, would worsen the ethnic problem and generate a backlash from the regional power, warned my father. ‘In an age of identity, ethnicity walks on water’ he said, pointing to inflamed sentiment in proximate Tamil Nadu and the increasingly influential Diaspora, of which the Sinhalese had no equivalent or counterweight to.  As it turned out, it was not the Tamil Tiger insurgency which put a halt to Minister Athulathmudali’s and Ravi Jayewardene’s importation of ‘the West Bank model’ as the Lanka Guardian called it, but precisely the ‘geo-political realities’ – the absence or furling of a superpower umbrella in the event of an abrupt assertion by the regional power — that Mervyn de Silva had tried to drum home into the ruling elite, to no avail, until the external ‘seismic shock’ of mid-1987.

Realism tells us that the North and East have to be secure over the long term. It tells us that the Sri Lankan security forces will remain overwhelmingly mono-ethnic at least in the short term. Realism, which is drawn in large part from world history, further tells us that in such a situation, a policy of permanent encampments and fortifications must be accompanied by alliances with the local elites and a degree of local autonomy. That autonomy must not be so large as to be dysfunctional to security and strategy but must be sufficiently broad to pre-empt local disaffection.  This has been the policy of successful empires from Rome to Britain.

Having an intermediate structure elected by the local populace and positioned between itself and the local populace, provides the Sri Lankan security forces with a social shock absorber and vital adjunct in preventive counter-insurgency. Sadly, it would seem as though Sri Lankan policy projections do not involve this latter aspect of sufficient local autonomy, and that the security aspect is designed to overlook, override, bypass or undermine that local autonomy should it be implemented under external pressure or internal political compulsion. The great Asian strategic thinker-practitioner Mao Ze Dong advocated a policy of ‘walking on two legs’. We seem intent on marching forward on one. The increased alienation of the Tamil people of the North and a widening gulf between the collective psyches of our main communities cannot be a pathway to stable security and permanent peace. The so-called demographic solution is no solution, as has been proved even in its conceptual birthplace — and notwithstanding a superpower blank cheque that Sri Lanka will never have.

While ‘facts are being created on the ground’, if the elected representatives of the Tamil people remain divided, with some dreaming of self-determination and others of federalism, and still others refuse to talk to their erstwhile comrades who are in government, instead of collectively pressing for the reasonable demand of the ‘turnkey’ re-activation of the existing Constitutional provisions as reiterated in bilateral statements and international undertakings, then these Tamil representatives will have only themselves to blame for the continuing and perhaps irreversible Tamil tragedy.

As if the inter-ethnic gap was not bad enough, the dominant ideology seems intent on setting the stage for generations of inter-religious hostility as well. Spokespersons for the Catholic Church well known for their moderation such as Fr Benedict Joseph and Fr Cyril Gamini have raised their voices in protest against the religious prejudices and overt mono-religiosity of the new History text books currently in use in Sri Lankan schools. What I find particularly disconcerting is that there was an earlier series of History text books in the pipe-line prepared and/or approved by some of Sri Lanka’s highest qualified historians and archaeologists such as Profs Sudharshan Seneviratne and Nira Wickramasinghe. Those rational well founded and enlightened texts were scrapped at the insistence of the rabble-rousing dominant ideologues and replaced with those that the spokespersons of the Catholic Church are now protesting against.

Sri Lanka is today at a crossroads. One road leads to reconciliation and a fresh start which enables us to integrate with Asia’s march to modernity. The other leads to a new and prolonged cycle of conflict.  The right kind of security policy for the North and East, a policy which derives from the best practises globally, a policy which is scientific and professional rather than driven by wrong interpretations of history and ethno-religious motivations, will enhance and ensure security. The wrong kind of security policy for the post-war North and East in which Sri Lankan armed forces cantonments become interlinked oases embedded in a hostile local population, may turn the entire area into a high insecurity zone.

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Justice C.G. Weeramantry was bestowed Sri Lankabhimanya, the highest National Honour of Sri Lanka in 2007. Justice Weeramantry also won the UNESCO Peace Education Prize in 2006 and the Right Livelihood Award in 2007, considered alternative Nobel Prize.

In this interview conducted several months ago, Justice Weeramantry talks about the importance of peace education in post-war Sri Lanka as a pillar of reconciliation. He also looks back at his career in law and experience as a Judge of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) from 1991 to 2000.

• Interview with Justice C.G. Weeramantry
• Defense and Devolution
• Rebuilding the East and Other Stories . . .
• Daily Security Report from UN – The plight of the North & East
• India, Sri Lanka and the Minority Question

The man on the street, people like myself, we’ll never know the whole truth. Some of us don’t care, terrorism, the LTTE were wiped out. That’s all that matters. We celebrated the great victory. In my corner of the stix in England, I celebrated the new sovereignty of my motherland, my country, my Paradise Island. My tears of joy like acid on their faces for the Tamil Diaspora.

It’s easy for me, for I don’t live there anymore. I am but the tourist who returns thrice a year. But I celebrate my roots, I celebrate that I am Sinhala Buddhist. I see beyond my birthright, but my eyes and ears remain closed.

The conflict within is clear. A world in recession, a world in decay where the poorer you are in terms of roots, connections and belonging, the more you suffer. The same in the Paradise Isle. Your ethnicity does not matter; it’s whom you know, where you’re from.

In the motherland, the ties to Russia, China and India are strengthened. A weird blast from the past. Bandaranayake socialism now called Mahinda Chintanaya. The President’s pro-labour and socialist history coming to light. One difference – there are no bread queues or people dying from food poisoning. People are dying in other ways, but that people die anyway is my self-justification.

Attention grabbing media headlines, pro and anti-government media. Who do I believe? I am never impartial for I still celebrate the sovereignty of the motherland. Does this make me a racist or a traitor?

Whenever I visit Sri Lanka, there is always new construction. Always something new happening. New places, new businesses and new roads. Roads that earmark economic prosperity.

A reporter killed, media silenced. Dissent severely disapproved. We are no longer a smiling, easygoing bunch of people. Are we now struggling to survive?

My motherland is governed by a dictatorship, for the greater good as some say. A justification for some, horribly wrong to some others.

I remain as always, confused. But unlike God Skanda who travels the world slaying demons, I travel to Sri Lanka at every opportunity for it’s the only place I truly belong.

• Saying what I want, when I want…
• Citizens held hostage in the name of ‘Nationalism’
• What are we celebrating? Questions to ponder
• Deepavali Dilemma: Reflections from the Diaspora
• The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing

Wimal Weerawansa announced that he would call upon his supporters to surround the UN office until the UN Secretary General disbanded the advisory panel he has set up on alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka.  It was reported that the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) had informed the UN that these were the views of an individual and not that of the GOSL.  Days later, Weerawansa, a cabinet minister and key supporter of the president and regime, leads a demonstration of hundreds to the UN office, blocks the entrances and exits to the building, declaring that they will not move until the panel is disbanded.

It has also been reported that the police attempted to disperse the demonstrators but were withdrawn, according to one report on the instructions of the Defence Secretary, and that a senior police officer was man-handled by the protestors.   The Foreign Secretary subsequently visited the office along with NFF representatives and managed to ensure that the besieged UN staff could be evacuated with police protection.   In a subsequent press conference, Weerawansa declared that unless the panel was not disbanded within a day, his supporters would embark on a fast unto death.  It is understood that the GOSL maintains that it will provide security to the UN staff at the same time as it respects the right of the NFF to demonstrate. UN staff, were instructed to work from home following the demonstration and attempted siege. Later, essential staff were allowed to return to work in the building and Weerawansa commenced his fast.

Weerawansa and his supporters were effectively placing the UN office under siege.  No one disputes their right to demonstrate, but to besiege the UN office surely raises questions about collective cabinet responsibility, our international obligations and policy –making?  Can a cabinet minister and indeed one who is known to be so close to the president of the republic, mouth off, bluster and threaten in this way on an issue which the regime has placed such overwhelming importance and can the government stand by and say he is acting in his individual capacity?  Can a cabinet minister unilaterally engage in such egregious action with possibly grave policy implications? Is collective cabinet responsibility so far removed from all of this? Indeed if he was acting without the consent and/or support of the president, will any action be taken against him for encroaching on the turf of what surely should be that of the minister of external affairs and for bringing the country into disrepute by besieging the office of the United Nations?  He is reported to have said that he is prepared to lose his cabinet position if the powers that be disagree with his action.

Mr Moon’s panel, pilloried by the regime, is the object of Mr Weerawansa’s “patriotic” ire.  Is this populist politics way out of control answering to the needs of a regime pathologically in need of an enemy and hyper sensitive to the war crimes charge or is this an excess of righteous enthusiasm in defence of our sovereignty?

The regime has gone to great lengths in a) insisting that Mr Moon has exceeded his powers under the Charter in appointing this panel and b) in insisting that there is no need for one since no such alleged crimes were committed by the security forces and that in any event as per the joint communique issued by Mr Moon and the president, the regime has set up its own Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).

On a) there appears to be difference of opinion.  Whilst a number of member countries of the NAM and Russia and China agree with the regime, others, mainly from the West do not and have urged the regime to call upon the expertise of the panel, seeing it as complementing the LLRC. The panel – incidentally headed by a former Indonesian attorney –general Darusman who the regime chose to appoint to the Independent International Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) attached to the Commission of Inquiry (COI) whose report nothing has been heard of since – is an advisory panel to the Secretary General.  It will make recommendations to him.  Any further action by the UN can only be pursuant to a Security Council resolution, which in turn will be vetoed by the Chinese and Russians, unless of course they are too embarrassed and/or appalled by the siege.

On b) were the panel to conclude that no war crimes were committed by members of the security forces the matter would effectively be laid to rest on the word of an international panel.  Likewise, were the panel to conclude that such crimes were committed by the LTTE, it would dispel the attempts to keep alive the “atrocities” of May 2009 as a means of galvanizing support for the secessionist cause.

In this context it should also be noted that the LLRC does not deal with accountability in respect of allegations of war crimes but rather into the causes of terrorism. It does not have investigative powers. Nor is it empowered by a victim and witness protection mechanism.  Neither does it meet the criteria enunciated by the US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice for such commissions, which were endorsed by the minister of external affairs.  Corresponding to the regime’s imputation of Darusman and other panel members’ bona fides is the point that the head of the LLRC was the former attorney general with whom the IIGEP had many problems.  There is also a committee that was appointed in response to the State Department report to the US Senate Appropriations Committee on allegations of war crimes in Sri Lanka. Some LLRC members sit on this committee. This committee was to have reported in December last year. Its deadline was then extended to April 2010 and now to July 2010.  Note, the LLRC has a mandate for four months.

Most worrying is the state of our foreign policy.  Both the GSP+ issue and the Moon Panel have been badly mismanaged.  The regime has misled the public over GSP+ form the outset-making it out to be a negotiation when it was an agreement with stated obligations and eminently amenable to a win-win outcome whereby the concession would have been extended and human rights protection strengthened.  The regime insisted too that it was politically motivated and the subject of a conspiracy hatched by local traitors and the international community bent on avenging the military defeat of the LTTE.  Whilst the final letter from the European Commission could definitely have been better drafted – a point reportedly made by some of the member states- it is relevant to ask as to whether the 15 conditions laid down in it were in response to eventual entreaties from the regime as to what it needed to do to secure extension of the concession or as to whether it was an unacceptable and unilateral ultimatum from the Commission to a sovereign state – as the regime insists it is.

Mr Moon’s panel has been blown out of proportion as the thin edge of the wedge in respect of an international war crimes probe.  As a consequence, the regime has invited speculation of the “ she doth protest too much” variety and it will have to fight the panel tooth and nail and probably not much else.  Yet another zero-sum situation that could have been avoided.  The regime wants to present a picture of political stability, peace and reconciliation but cannot resist confrontation, bombast and turbulence.   Their brand of populist politics and pseudo-patriotism leads them to dig policy holes for themselves and destroys the goodwill this country has earned over the years as a respected member of the international community.

Foreign policy cannot be made on the street and God forbid that Weerawansa alone on a tiny stage, except for a motley crew of cohorts, fasting to death outside the UN building should be emblematic of Sri Lanka in the international community.

• The protest by Wimal Weerawansa against the UN in Sri Lanka: Condoned by government?
• Sri Lankan Minister continues farce
• Defence Secretary: The epitome of bad governance
• Focus on Human Rights
• On Commission and Omission

The point of departure for this note is the fast unto death by a government (cabinet) Minister, hereinafter referred to as VW, in front of the UN’s Colombo office. The protest campaign launched by the said individual, and his decision to fast, are meant at demonstrating his party’s (and, being a vocal member of the governing coalition, the present government’s) opposition to the investigative panel appointed by the UN SG on alleged war crimes during the last phase of civil war in early/mid 2009.

The UN SG has been functioning under prerogatives accorded to him in his mandate. The most recent precedent for a panel of this nature is that on Israel’s thoroughly questionable conduct in the Gaza strip, and its recent atrocities over a humanitarian vessel. Let’s not forget that this panel is chaired by Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN. How can Sri Lankan diplomats currently posted to the UN explain Minister VW’s anti-UN protests in Colombo to the UN and to fellow diplomats in Geneva, New York and Vienna? The simple way out is to emphasize that Sri Lanka is a ‘democratic state’ where people are allowed to protest, express their opinions and make themselves heard. VW’s protest is therefore not an impediment to the diplomatic interactions between the government of Sri Lanka and the UN. This was precisely the argument presented by the island’s Permanent Representative to the UN during an interview with the Sri Lanka daily Daily Mirror Online, when questioned on Sinhala nationalist opposition to a durable political settlement to the ethnic question in the post-May 2009 phase. To someone even vaguely familiar with recent goings-on in Sri Lanka, the counter-argument is not so difficult to find: what about the countless journalists who were beaten up, assassinated in cold blood and disappeared for ‘expressing’ themselves? What about those critical of the present government and its policies and the manner in which such opposition is strongly suppressed? What about the ban on news websites that adopt a critical stance on the present government? It looks as if the ‘democratic’ nature of the Sri Lankan state and the right of citizens to express themselves freely makes a glorious resurgence from time to time, whenever  it helps the interests of the present government.

As responsible citizens, let’s look at VW’s protest critically. This is a protest campaign that receives ample tacit support from the highest levels of the present government. The objective seems to be to demonstrate the extent to which citizens are angry at the UN and its SG for their resolve to question the conduct of the Sri Lankan government and military during the last phases of the war. It is also a fine strategy to oust Sinhala nationalist feelings among the wider Sinhala-speaking community, and keep them ‘occupied’ with nationalist candy. In one news website (not accessible from Sri Lanka), it was reported that the secretary to the Ministry of Finance had informed the Minister for Economic Development that a delegation of prospective investors currently visiting Sri Lanka were deeply concerned about VW’s protest. The Secretary had informed the Minister that activities of this nature could have a potentially negative impact on efforts at post-conflict economic regeneration and investment promotion. This may bear a certain degree of truth, but it is unlikely that the present government will be too worried about such a risk. It can run the show as long as it enjoys the support of the Chinese government, the Pakistanis, the Russians, the Iranians, the Burmese and so on.

The present government, with all its flaws and discrepancies, represents the best available option for the Sri Lankan electorate, in a political context where the parliamentary opposition has been sent down the drain for some fourteen years by a single individual whose power within his party remains surreally ‘absolute’ (anecdote: the recent decision of the United National Party to appoint a Council of Leaders, i.e. Sinhalese Nayakathva Mandalaya, instead of replacing its current failed leadership with the energy of a new generation provides ample testimony to the ‘surreal’  position of the present UNP leadership). Despite its position of ‘all-powerful winner’, firmly consolidated by combating the challenges imposed by the LTTE, it cannot afford to play constant hard ball with its diplomatic machinery. Despite repeated pleas by the international community (i.e. the EU, the US and national and supranational bodies representing the ‘liberal’ Western power base, not the wider ‘international community’, which includes states of the global south, as Sri Lanka’s present PR to the UNHQ once noted in the same interview mentioned earlier in this article), it is crystal clear that no external power has a strong strategic interest in forcing the Rajapakse administration to draft a political settlement to the ethnic question, on the issue of human rights or alleged war crimes. In this sense, the Rajapakse administration is one of the strongest governments in the world today. Its success in combating its secessionist opponent through military means even surpasses the military feats of the State of Israel. Despite the tremendous support of the West and its military might, the latter has not gained significant victories over the Hezbollah, over the PLO or any of its opponents. While Tel-Aviv is forced to play soft-ball with roaring international criticism over the recent issue of the humanitarian vessel, Sri Lanka’s Rajapakse administration is in a much stronger position to express its thorough opposition to any form of international criticism on its management of the military offensive, a political settlement, the ‘transparency’ of its so-called ‘Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’ or any related issue. As President Rajapakse categorically stated in his recent interview with Al-Jazeera, concerns over transparency issues are to be shunned, and before such concerns are raised over Sri Lanka, they ought to be raised about USA and UK over Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Moreover (according to the President), the government of Sri Lanka may indeed look into alleged war crimes during the last phase of the war, but it certainly cannot afford to prosecute anyone for defeating terrorism. In other words, whatever the post-May 2009 (and especially post-April 2010) Rajapakse administration does, whether it be a political settlement based on devolution, a truth commission, dialogue with the Tamil diaspora or anthing else, it will do so solely on its own exclusive terms. This is a salient reality silently understood by the international community, despite its not infrequent nudges on Colombo over issues of concern such as alleged war crimes allegations, which help keep the international news media and vocal elements of the Tamil diaspora occupied.

In such a political zeitgeist, it is thoroughly pointless for the present government to support initiatives such as that of Minister VW over the UN allegations. The fundamental flaw, as this writer perceives it, is in the relatively remarkable absence of a diplomatic strategy that corresponds to the needs of the present Sri Lankan government (i.e. the post-LTTE, or post-:May 2009 phase).  One cannot help reaching the conclusion that what inhabits the Republic Building in Colombo is a diplomatic machinery with strong lacuna in terms of strategy and diplomatic foresight. One commentator recently compared Sri Lanka’s Minister of External Affairs to an adult with candy (i.e. Sinhalese seeni boola) in his shirt pocket, who gives candy to cheeky kids to keep them (i.e. in this analogy, members of the international community) happy and calm. The role of the Sri Lankan External Affairs Minister certainly is in par with this ‘candy-man analogy; it can be noticed whenever he is brought to deal with his counterparts in the international community, such as during his recent visit to the USA, which included a lecture at CSIS Washington DC. Like a player unfamiliar with the rules of the game but still playing away, the Minister attempts to chat up the US government and the UN’s high command on Colombo’s tremendous military feats and its resolve to examine alleged war crimes, in the form of a commission inspired by the South African TRC and the UK’s Chilcot Commission (NB: the minister makes these observations in his CSIS speech, available in the South Asia section of the CSIS website). In his candy-man role, the Minister (and, very obviously, the entire diplomatic corps) fails to utilise the existing trend in international politics vis-à-vis Sri Lanka to the advantage of the Sri Lankan state. The government of Sri  Lanka is in a strong position to express firm diplomatic opposition to the UN SG’s move. If a right-minded diplomatic strategist headed the Republic Building today, they could effectively utilize the prevalent situation (i.e. UN SG’s panel vs. the international community’s lack of a strategic interest over Sri Lankan issues) to actively promote the Sri Lankan government, make its voice heard in the international scene as a strong state that defends its interests diplomatically, and despite its firm (and realistically speaking,  inevitable) resolve to manage post-conflict concerns on its own terms, it is a government capable of strong international alliances, in terms of economic, cultural and educational cooperation. Instead of working through the present situation to make things more profitable to the Sri Lankan government, and make it possible for the Head of State to shake hands freely with any of his Western (i.e. EU and NATO member states except Turkey in the latter case) counterparts ASAP, thereby categorically reconfiguring Sri Lanka’s image and position in the international scene, the government is engaging in low-level petty politics by using its local mouthpieces such as Minister VW to stage protests in front of the UN, deporting HR and NGO activists and stating on international media that a former army commander should be killed on charges of treason. Despite its quintessentially Spartan capacity to reach the strong position it currently finds itself in, those heading the Rajapakse administration’s executive, national defence and foreign policy establishments have amply proven, a year into the post-Piraba phase that they do not possess that shrewd Athenian strategic maturity to work their way around Lanka’s renewed position in the post-2009 international political landscape. This situation explains the farce (better expressed in Sinhalese/Tamil nadagam) currently taking place in Colombo city, which includes carnival items such as (rather childish) anti-UN protests, blocking and barricading international ground, diplomatic visa refusals and deportations.

• Photos from Day 3 of NFF protest against UN in Colombo
• Sri Lanka’s new found friends: Looking for love in all the wrong places
• The ‘post-LTTE’ misnomer
• Not signing the Rome Statute is not enough! (A response to Ranil Wickremasinghe and Mangala Samaraweera)
• Rajapaksrized Chauvinism in Flowery prose: Sri Lankan Diplomat’s outright humiliation of Sri Lankan Tamils

In his physically weakened condition, what he said was not voluble enough to be captured by Vikalpa’s video camera. However, a woman’s strident and emotionally charged call to save his life at the end of the video captures the essential volatility of the situation in front of the UN, and how quickly a deterioration in Wimal’s condition, a statement by him, or action by the NFF can escalate tensions, with a domino effect elsewhere in the country by party loyalists and others.

Also during the course of the 9th, though Wimal Weerawansa sought to resign from his Ministerial post of Housing and Construction, the President refused to accept his resignation.

• The protest by Wimal Weerawansa against the UN in Sri Lanka: Condoned by government?
• Photos and video from the UN headquarters in Colombo today
• Making Foreign Policy on the Street
• Photos from Day 3 of NFF protest against UN in Colombo
• Current situation in Jaffna, Sri Lanka: A resident speaks out